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This is in many ways a rather trying book.
The author exhibits a passion for lengthy
narration and quotation which transforms
virtually every citation of a legal case or men-
tion of an incident into a long-winded anec-
dote, replete with factual detail and padded
with the texts of judicial opinions, United
Nations resolutions, and the like. The lawyer’s
love of the professional jargon, which special-
izes in Latin tags, prevails even to the point
of reference to &dquo;a domus divided against it-
self&dquo; (p. 101); the author’s infatuation with
a particular prefix leads him to coin such a
monstrosity as &dquo;the suprasupreme Constitu-
tion&dquo; (p. 43). Beyond this, there is an undis-
ciplined quality about the book which is re-
flected in the fact that France’s reservation
concerning the acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court is treated in
chapter ix, while discussion of the same topic
in relation to the United States is held back
for chapter xi.
The volume has many of the earmarks of
an analytical treatise on the relationship be-
tween international and domestic law in the
American constitutional system; indeed, it
has considerable value as a contribution to
understanding of the intricacies of that rela-
tionship. However, it is clear that the book
is an exercise in advocacy, rather than in
analysis pure and simple. McClure favors the
creation of a world legal order, marked by
the genuine subordination of states, with their
particular legal systems, to the all-encompass-
ing and overriding authority of a global legal
system.
McClure’s advocacy has the important
virtue of being based upon an awareness and
understanding of the international legal sys-
tem which is in being and in process of evo-
lution. Enthusiasts for world law all too often
betray an abysmal ignorance of international
law-an ignorance which they are unwilling
to remedy because they assume that interna-
tional law is meaningless and worthless. They
can dispose of international law in one quick
glance, with one negative comment about its
significance, and then move on to the sug-
gestion that mankind must start from scratch
to create an overarching legal order. To his
great credit, McClure avoids this error. He is
willing to examine the law of the past and
present before having his say about the law
of the future. Moreover, he is realistic enough
to envisage the creation of world law as a de-
velopmental process-involving the transfor-
mation of the present system of international
law into a more adequate system-rather than
to postulate a juridical leap from assumed
anarchy to desired order.
Indeed, the author regards that process as
an operative phenomenon. He is impressed
by twentieth-century trends in international
law and organization-the legal prohibition of
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aggression, the assertion of the principle that
individuals are internationally liable for
&dquo;crimes against peace,&dquo; the concept that the
principles of the United Nations Charter are
valid even for states outside the organization,
the evolving formal authority and compe-
tence of organs of the United Nations and
other multilateral institutions, etc. In short,
he argues that a hopeful movement toward a
world legal order is already under way.
McClure’s evaluation of recent trends can
be criticized as excessively optimistic. To this
reviewer, he appears rather too determined
to see things in a hopeful light. It is perhaps
revealing that he chooses to relegate to a foot-
note his discussion of the incapacity of the
United Nations to mitigate the Hungarian
tragedy of 1956, while he gives more promi-
nent treatment to the more encouraging ex-
perience of the United Nations in handling
the simultaneous Suez crisis (pp. 244-45).
Nevertheless, it must be said that McClure
provides a salutary antidote to the wide-
spread tendency to equate pessimism with
realism. NA’e need to be reminded that grim-
ness is not an essential criterion of the validity
of facts; an alleged fact is not necessarily un-
true merely because it is hopeful. A man who
is looking for signs of progress toward a world
legal order is entitled to take note of concepts
which have been established in principle,
even though little or no progress may have
been made in assuring their effective appli-
cation. It is a curious commentary on our
present-day mentality that a world govern-
ment advocate might well dismiss the evolu-
tion of a principle of order under United
Nations auspices as inconsequential, while he
would regard the incorporation of the same
principle in a world constitutional document
as a magnificent achievement; or that a &dquo;real-
ist&dquo; would not challenge the tough-minded-
ness of a scholar who discovered &dquo;sovereign-
ty&dquo; as a meaningful principle in contemporary
world affairs but would look askance at
McClure for his assertion that principles mak-
ing for international orderliness are evolving.
To put it bluntly, a scholar can purchase im-
munity from having his realism called into
question by the simple expedient of refusing
to see anything particularly promising in re-
cent international legal and organizational
developments. McClure displays admirable
intellectual integrity in refusing to join the
conformity of pessimism and insisting instead
that a true scholar ought to be capable of
looking a fact in the eye, even though it be
an encouraging and heartening fact.
Another major virtue of McClure’s work
lies in his frank recognition that there is
much which the United States can and should
do to promote the development of a more
effective international legal order. Americans
have a passion for the &dquo;rule of law&dquo; and a
predilection for exhorting the world to adopt
this formula; McClure reminds us that our
national deeds have not comported with our
national words. Specifically, he challenges the
notion that our constitutional order requires
that international legal obligations should be
subordinated to domestic-law manifestations
of the national will. His analysis of the treat-
ment of the international law problem by
American courts leads him to the conclusion
that they have expressed a nationalistic bias
in developing such concepts as the inapplica-
bility of provisions of &dquo;non-self-executing&dquo;
treaties until and unless Congress passes im-
plementing legislation, and the judicial duty
to treat a later federal statute as legally su-
perior to an earlier treaty. These rules are
not, he argues, either constitutionally neces-
sary or logically tenable; rather, they repre-
sent a long-standing American unwillingness
to tolerate the notion of a superior legal order,
limiting national legal sovereignty, which
Americans have made the object of such elo-
quent lip-service. The author notes that a
number of other states have been modifying
their constitutional schemes to facilitate their
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operating under a supervening system of in-
ternational law, while the United States has
narrowly defeated the Brickerite move to
shift our system in precisely the opposite
direction.
A major thesis of the book is that the
United States should, by constitutional rein-
terpretation or by constitutional amendment
if necessary, recognize that international law
-whether deriving from treaties or from cus-
tom-is unconditionally superior in authority
to any variety of American domestic law.
There is merit in McClure’s contention that
concrete action of this sort would contribute
more to the prospects for a world legal order
than a continuing flow of pious speeches
about &dquo;the rule of law.&dquo;
The author’s insistence on this point is
illustrative of another meritorious feature of
the work: its recognition that a world legal
order can be achieved only with the support
of and through favorable action by national
states. This might seem self-evident, but it is
a fact that much contemporary advocacy of
world law is animated by an escapist urge
to ignore national states into oblivion, to move
toward a universal legal order by going
around rather than through national instru-
mentalities. In this view, the incorrigible na-
tional state is an obstacle which must be by-
passed in the march to a global order. Surely
McClure is on sounder ground than this when
he takes his stand on the proposition: &dquo;The
appropriate procedure with respect to the
world community would seem to be the de-
velopment of national constitutions as the ties
binding nations to the world community rath-
er than the use of supravening law alone to
bring about that end&dquo; (p. 206). The nations
may not build an effective international order,
but it assuredly will not be built despite them,
by some massive upsurge of a global general
will which enables &dquo;humanity,&dquo; brushing na-
tional political institutions aside, to act as a
single constituent force. If a world legal order
is to be created, this will result not from the
fact that states have been out-maneuvered
but from the fact that their support has been
enlisted for the enterprise.
As world law schemes go, then, this one
has much to commend it. The present re-
viewer’s basic quarrel is with the central
theme of world law schemes in general, this
one included. That theme is the efficacy and
sufficiency of law as an instrument of social
order; it carries with it a tendency to demean
the significance of political processes while
stressing the order-creating potential of legal
processes.
McClure is clearly a law-stresser. He wants
the world &dquo;made safe for law-sovereignty&dquo;
(p. 326). He suggests that &dquo;It may be pri-
marily through the instrumentality of the
courts of law at all levels ... that the greatest
objective of statesmanship, a law-abiding
world, will eventually be chiefly maintained&dquo;
(p. 69). He envisages a &dquo;universal society
with its world-wide cooperation through a so-
cial creation, law, with the minimal political
apparatus necessary to keep law modern, just,
effective, and impartially enforced&dquo; (p. 323).
He indorses President Eisenhower’s state-
ment that &dquo;In a very real sense the world no
longer has a choice between force and law.
If civilization is to survive, it must choose the
rule of law&dquo; (p. 323).
While the author concedes the require-
ment of a &dquo;minimal political apparatus&dquo; to
function as handmaiden of the law, it is clear
that he regards law, not politics, as the key
to order. His incapacity to think in political
terms is strikingly illustrated when he cites a
passage from United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral Hammarskjold in which the latter asserts
that the &dquo;greatest need today is to blunt the
edges of conflict among the nations.... If
properly used, the United Nations can serve
a diplomacy of reconciliation....&dquo; McClure
agrees completely and draws from Ham-
marskjold’s statement the surprising conclu-
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sion that &dquo;workers for world legal order must
concern themselves fundamentally with the
matter of selecting judges who can command
universal respect... , and they must encour-
age more law-making ...&dquo; (pp. 320-21 ) .
Here is the Secretary-General pleading for a
more effective international political process
and McClure automatically translating it as
a plea for laws and judges! McClure expresses
the hope that the General Assembly may be-
come a genuine law-making body, and he
makes the curious proposal that the American
delegation to the Assembly should be headed
by the President in person and staffed and
supported by an administrative apparatus
completely divorced from the State Depart-
ment. &dquo;Since the purpose of the representa-
tion is participation in a supranational legal
order, it would seem that it had better not be
joined to the machinery of the United
States government for carrying on traditional
international relations...&dquo; (p. 301). The
State Department, it seems, is concerned with
world politics, which must be carefully ex-
cluded from a system of world law.
In the opinion of this reviewer, we can
make little progress toward world order until
we cease thinking of politics as a dirty word
and of law as a magic wand. Americans in
particular need to be emancipated from the
illusion that social peace and order are the
fruits of &dquo;the rule of law.&dquo; A strong case could
be made for the proposition that the United
States owes its domestic tranquillity to &dquo;the
rule of politics.&dquo; The truth is that both legal
and political processes contribute to the
maintenance of order in our society. It is sub-
mitted, however, that the primary burden of
managing the conflicts which might tear
asunder a modern pluralistic society falls
upon the politicians, specialists in the accom-
modation of interests, rather than upon the
judges, specialists in the declaration of rights
and duties. It might be recalled that our Civil
War occurred soon after the judges disman-
tled the delicate framework of compromise
which the politicians had constructed.
The problem of averting an international
civil war demands not that international poli-
tics be eliminated but that the international
political process be improved. Law is not the
sole alternative to violence, and it may not
be as promising as the alternative of politics.
If the world is to be saved from destruction,
we need to develop a more sophisticated
understanding than we have yet achieved of
the interrelationship between legal and po-
litical processes as mechanisms of order. Such
an understanding will not be promoted by
law-stressers who brush politics aside as un-
worthy of notice or acceptance.
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